Abstract. In his "From classical to constructive probability" (2003), Brian Weatherson offers a generalization of Kolmogorov's axioms of classical probability that is neutral regarding the logic for the object-language. Weatherson's generalized notion of probability can hardly be regarded as adequate, as the example of supervaluationist logic shows. At least, if we model credences as betting rates, the Dutch-Book argument strategy does not support Weatherson's notion of supervaluationist probability, but various alternatives. Depending on whether supervaluationist bets are specified as (a) conditional bets (Cantwell (2006) (2008)), supervaluationist probability amounts to (a) conditional probability of truth given a truth-value, (b) the expected truth-value, or (c) the probability of truth respectively.
value 1, and (iii) it meets the finite additivity constraint, which says that for any pair of sentences A and B, if they are jointly classically inconsistent, their disjunction takes as value the sum of the values of A and of B respectively. 1 Classical probability fixes the logic as classical logic. In his "From classical to constructive probability" (2003: 112), Brian Weatherson generalizes Kolmogorov's axioms to obtain conditions defining, for any given logic, a class of probability functions. According to this, if ╞ is the entailment relation on our language L, any function P that takes real numbers as values for sentences of L is a probability function just in case it satisfies for every pair of sentences of L, A and B, the following conditions: 
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Weatherson does not offer any argument in favor of generalized probability.
He introduces the calculus as characterizing the class of "essentially Kolmogorovian"
probability functions (p. 111). If one takes respect for logic, and general additivity as 'essential' features of any notion of probability, trivially, one ends up with generalized probability. But insofar as generalized probability is meant to have a normative bearing on the structure of subjective probability -as Weatherson suggests -the question arises whether these "essentially Kolmogorovian" features are adequate. In particular, the question arises whether they are adequate for every logical framework. I contend that they are not. For a case in point, it is shown that generalized probability runs into serious trouble if it is applied to supervaluationist logic. 
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D~A¬, that is, assume A to be gappy (neither true nor false). 3 With these results in place, consider the notion of probability that we obtain from generalized probability for supervaluationist logic -call it supervaluationist generalized probability, henceforth abbreviated as SGP. Call any SGP-function P dogmatic with respect to a logically contingent sentence A just in case P(A) = 0 or P(A) = 1. 4 It turns out that SGP is strongly dogmatic with respect to every logically contingent sentential expression of gappiness of the form ⌐~DA & ~D~A¬, in the sense that every SGP-function is dogmatic with respect to it. Specifically, any sentence of this form is to receive the value zero, as can be seen by the following reasoning. For any SGP-function P, we have: By (a) and (GP1), (i) P(A & ~A) = 0. By (a) and (GP2), (ii) P(A ~A) = 1. By (b) and (GP3), (iii) P(A) = P(DA) and P(~A) = P(D~A). By (c) and ( This objection draws on an assumption that is even rejectable for classical probability. For one, the assumption that certainty amounts to a subjective probability one is false for classical distributions over possibility-spaces with uncountably many elements. Specifically, such distributions cannot satisfy the regularity constraint: a probability distribution over a set of propositions (that is, sets of worlds) is regular just in case it assigns probability zero only to the empty proposition and probability one only to the universal proposition. As a consequence, some propositions would to receive a value one or a value zero, even though they are contingent.
The finite additivity principle implies that for any possibility-space, there are at most n elements with a probability at least 1/n. From this, it follows that at most countably many elements can have a positive probability. Compare Williamson (2007: 173) and Howson (2003: 75) .
For another, even for classical distributions on possibility spaces with countably many elements, regularity cannot be taken for granted.
See the argument in (Williamson 2007: 174) , which relies on a uniformity constraint on assignments for elements in possibility-spaces.
The requirement that subjective probability be a measure of certainty sets a standard that is not even met by classical probability. Thus, if the objection from credence as a measure of certainty applies to Weatherson's generalization, it also applies to classical probability. And insofar as the objection is only aimed at Weatherson's way of generalizing classical probability, it misfires.
Here is another objection. The idea that whatever is logically possible may be also coherently believed to a positive degree is not indisputable. For a case in point against it, consider the DutchBook strategy of vindicating classical probability. The default assumption in standard Dutch-Book arguments is that the modal space of possible outcomes of a bet is not affected by the placement of the bet. That this assumption is not always safe is shown by bets regarding hypotheses such as
The winner of the next horse race is Golden Arrow, and a zero betting quotient regarding "The winner of the next horse race is Golden
Arrow" is accepted as fair.
If we accept a positive betting-quotient for (#) as fair, then it is to be ruled out that (#) may turn out true -for the second conjunct is then in any case false. Any bet regarding (#) with a positive quotient is hence susceptible to a Dutch Book.
The argument runs analogously to the Dutch-Book argument to the effect that value zero is to be assigned to logical falsities. 5 (#) however is clearly logically contingent. Hence, we have an argument that our degrees of belief are to be dogmatic with respect to some particular logically contingent sentences. This argument strategy seems to be of no avail though for motivating Weatherson's suggested kind of dogmatism. For example, if we award a positive chance to the possibility that a given patch is a borderline case of redness, then this possibility is not thereby ruled out.
This leads me to the objection I would like to raise. Or so I am going to argue.
From classical to supervaluationist probability
Weatherson gives a motivation for the intuitionist version of generalized probability by way of a Dutch-Book argument. Thus, it cannot be considered as unfair also to assess the supervaluationist version of generalized probability by the same standard and to look for support in the form of a Dutch-Book argument. In what follows, I
discuss what I take to be the most natural options of generalizing classical bets for a supervaluationist framework. All of the associated notions of probability that can be vindicated by way of Dutch-Book arguments are distinct from SGP.
Recall how the Dutch-Book argument strategy runs for a classical framework.
A Book consists of a function P of 'betting-quotients' and a function S of 'stakes', where both functions map the language into reals -with S taking non-zero values only for finitely many sentences. The betting-quotient distribution is chosen by the bettor, the stake distribution is chosen by the bookie. If the stake for a hypothesis is positive, the bettor places a bet on the hypothesis, if the stake for a hypothesis is negative, she places a bet against the hypothesis. Possible outcomes are representable as classical interpretations of the language, taking either value 1 ('truth') or 0 ('false') for sentences. The payoff for a bet regarding a hypothesis A is (1 -P(A))  S(A) iff A is true, otherwise the payoff is -P(A)  S(A). The payoff for a Book for any classical interpretation ICL is thus given by:
The idea of Dutch-Book arguments is to characterize the class of coherent bettingquotient distributions as the class of distributions that are safe from a sure loss contract (a 'Dutch-Book'), that is, a Book where the payoff is in any case negative.
Supervaluationist interpretations are not bivalent. They take either value 1 ('truth'), 0 ('false'), or a third value ('neither true nor false'). So how to generalize the Dutch-Book argument strategy for supervaluationist interpretations? The question boils down to the question of how to generalize the payoff conditions for nonbivalent frameworks where sentences may be either true, false, or gappy. I discuss three natural options: Conditional bets (Cantwell (2006) ), unconditional bets with graded payoffs (Milne (2008) ), and unconditional bets with ungraded payoffs (Dietz (2008) ). All these provisos are met in a standard supervaluationist framework. For our purposes, it does to focus on the supervaluationist instance of Cantwell's probability calculus:
Any function P that takes reals as values for sentences of L is a supervaluationist conditional probability function just in case for every pair of truthdeterminate sentences, A and B, that is, sentences that are truth-valued for every supervaluationist interpretation,
If A is (relative to ╞SV) logically equivalent to B, then P(A) = P(B), 
For the truth-determinate fragment of L, probability functions of this type are classical probability functions. For sentences A of L in general, supervaluationist conditional probability amounts to classical conditional probability that A is true,
given it has a truth-value. As a first result, we are safe from Weatherson's strong dogmatism with respect to every expression of gappiness: For every statement of gappiness, the classical probability of truth may be positive just in case the statement in question is logically contingent. Supervaluationist conditional probability thus is not as strong as Weatherson's SGP. Let us have a closer look at the individual axioms. The classical constraints (1) and (3) are generally valid. 7 Supervaluationist logical truths and supervaluationist inconsistent sentences receive the value one and zero respectively. The constraint (2), however, is not generally valid. For any supervaluationist conditional probability function P where 0 < P(DA  D~A) < 1, we have: P(A) > P(DA). However, for any sentence A, A and ⌐DA¬ are equivalent in supervaluationist logic. Hence, a fortiori, supervaluationist single-premise entailment is not generally respected. Also the finite additivity constraint (4) is not generally valid, which implies that general additivity also does not generally hold. 8 Consequently two principles of generalized probability, (GP3) and (GP4), are invalid for the general case where also truth-indeterminate sentences may be considered.
(b) Unconditional bets with graded payoffs. We may think of supervaluationist interpretations in analogy to many-valued interpretations, as ranging over degrees of truth, with the maximal value 1 for 'truth', the minimal value 0 for 'falsity', and an
13
intermediate value c for 'gappiness' -plausibly c is 0.5, but it may be also any other real number greater than 0 and smaller than 1. The natural idea is then to let the payoff for a bet on (against) a hypothesis be the higher (the lower) the truer it comes out. This comes down to classical payoffs, just with non-bivalent interpretations I, which may take intermediate degrees and which allow for graded payoffs:
Peter Milne (2008) gives Dutch-Book arguments for unconditional bets of this type for fuzzy and many-valued logics where valuations are additive, that is: for any valuation v and any sentences A and B, v(A & B) + v(A  B) = v(A) + v(B).
Supervaluationist logic is not additive. For example, it allows pairs of sentences A and B both to be gappy, with their disjunction being gappy as well and their
conjunction being false: for instance, the sentences This patch is red, This patch is green and This patch is red or green may all receive the intermediate value c ('is gappy'), with
This patch is both red and green receiving the value 0 ('is false'). As c  0, additivity thus fails. If we apply the Dutch-Book argument strategy for unconditional bets with graded payoffs to supervaluationist logic, we can vindicate the following notion of probability:
Any function P that takes reals as values for sentences of L is a supervaluationist unconditional probability function for graded payoffs just in case for every pair of truth-determinate sentences, A and B, that is, sentences that are truth-valued for every supervaluationist interpretation, P satisfies (1)- (4), and for every sentence A, P satisfies (5*) P(A) = P(DA) + (P(~DA & ~D~A)  c). 9 For the truth-determinate fragment, probability functions of this type are classical probability functions. (4) is not satisfied, by failure of the additivity constraint for semantic values. 12 The expected truth-value for logical truths is one, and the expected truth-value of logical contradictions is zero. Thus as the expected truth-values of logical contradictions is zero, general additivity also fails. Even 15 worse, not even (2) is satisfied, whatever real c (with 0 < c < 1) we chose as intermediate value. Thus a fortiori, single premise entailment is not respected. 13 What we end up with is hence a notion of supervaluationist probability that violates the same principles of generalized probability as conditional supervaluationist probability: neither (GP3) nor (GP4) are valid.
The foregoing two notions of supervaluationist probability are neither additive nor respecting single-premise entailment. The following option seems in this respect the most attractive one in that it validates all principles of generalized probability that make sure that logic is respected, albeit general additivity turns out again invalid. 
where V is a two-place function that maps pairs of non-bivalent interpretations I and sentences of L into {0,1} as follows:
Starting from payoff conditions of this type, we obtain for supervaluationist logic by way of Dutch-Book arguments the following notion of probability:
Any function P that takes reals as values for sentences of L is a supervaluationist unconditional probability function for ungraded payoffs just in case for every pair of truth-determinate sentences, A and B, that is, sentences that are truthvalued for every supervaluationist interpretation, P satisfies (1)- (4), and for every sentence A, P satisfies (5**) P(A) = P(DA). 14 For the truth-determinate fragment, probability functions of this type are classical probability functions. In the general case, supervaluationist unconditional probability for ungraded payoffs are classical probabilities of truth. Probabilities of truth satisfy (1) and also (2) -importantly, they also respect single premiseentailment. However they neither satisfy (3) nor the finite additivity constraint (4).
Importantly, for supervaluationist logic, classical probabilities of truth allow positive values for any logically contingent statement of gappiness -again we are safe from
Weatherson's suggested type of strong dogmatism. That supervaluationist unconditional probability for ungraded payoffs is a weakening of SGP is clearer to see on the following reformulation. Any function P that takes reals as values for sentences of L is a supervaluationist unconditional probability function for ungraded 17 payoffs just in case it satisfies for every pair of sentences of L, A and B, the following conditions: 15
As a result, the general additivity constraint (GP4) is not valid. But unlike in the foregoing alternatives, probability respects logic in all relevant regards. In view of these features, it seems fair to view probability of truth as the most attractive candidate for modeling degree of belief in a supervaluationist framework. 16 
Conclusion
Brian Weatherson suggests that our degrees of belief are to respect logic and to be additive, whatever logic we may adopt. I argued that this general requirement runs into serious trouble for supervaluationist logic in that it suggests an ill-motivated strong dogmatism with respect to every logically contingent statement of gappiness.
If we model degrees of beliefs as betting quotients considered as fair, all natural generalizations of classical bets for supervaluationist frameworks end up in notions of probability that are safe from Weatherson's suggested type of strong dogmatism. (1)- (4) for every truthdeterminate sentence and (5*) for every sentence can be Dutch booked.
Proof. Suppose that P is a betting-quotient distribution that satisfies both (1)- (4) for every truth-determinate sentence and (5*) for every sentence, and that there is a Dutch Book B0 for P. Then the stakes for finitely many truth-indeterminate sentences must be distinct from zero; for by the converse Dutch-Book argument for classical probability for bivalent languages (Kemeny (1955) ), there is no Dutch Book for betting quotients for truth-determinate sentences meeting (1)- (4) . Let {A1, …, An} be the set of truth-indeterminate sentences for which the stake distribution S0 in B0 takes a non-zero value. Define a new stake function S1 as follows: S1(A) = 0, S1 ( B1 has the same net gain for any outcome as B0. By (n-1)-many reiterations of this procedure, we obtain a Book Bn that agrees with B0 in the net gains for all possible outcomes, and where only truth-determinate sentences have a non-zero stake value.
As, by (1)- (4) for truth-determinate sentences, the betting-quotients for these sentences have a classical structure, it follows by the converse Dutch-Book argument for classical probability for bivalent languages, that Bn cannot be a Dutch Book. By reductio, P cannot be Dutch booked. □ Theorem 3. Any set of betting quotients that violates (5**) for some sentence or some law among (1)- (4) for some truth-determinate sentence can be Dutch booked.
Proof. For truth-determinate sentences A and B, supervaluationist entailment satisfies the constraint (Equivalence) and (Mutual Incompatibility). By the standard Dutch Book arguments for bivalent probability, we are hence free to assume that (1)- (4) hold for truth-determinate sentences. We only need to show then that a violation of (5**) can be Dutch booked. Assume P(A)  P(DA). Case (a): P(A) < P(DA). Set S(A) = -1, S(DA) = 1, and for the remaining sentences, give zero stakes. The payoffs for this book for any interpretation I are then given as:
For every possible assignment, the net gains are thus negative. For the converse case (b) that P(A) > P(DA), set S(A) = 1 and S(DA) = -1, and for the remaining sentences,
give zero stakes. Again (by parity of reasoning) the net gains are for every possible assignment negative. Consequently, if P(A)  P(DA), P can be Dutch booked. □
Theorem 4.
No set of betting quotients that satisfies both (1)- (4) for every truthdeterminate sentence and (5**) for every sentence can be Dutch booked.
Proof. Suppose there is a set of betting quotients P that both satisfies the constraints (1)-(4) for every truth-determinate sentence and (5**) for every sentence, and is susceptible to a Dutch Book B0. Then the stakes for some truth-indeterminate sentences must be distinct from zero; for by the converse Dutch-Book argument for classical probability for bivalent languages (Kemeny (1955) ), there is no Dutch Book for betting quotients for truth-determinate sentences that meet (1)- (4) . Let {A1, …., An} be the set of truth-indeterminate sentences for which the stake distribution S0 in B0 takes values distinct from zero. Define a new stake function S1 on L as follows: S1(A1) = 0, S1(DA1) = S0(DA1) + S0(A1); for all other sentences A, S1(A) = S0(A). The net gains for the resulting book B1 are then for every assignment the same as on B0. By (n-1)-many reiterations of this procedure, we obtain from B0 a book Bn that agrees with in the net gains for all possible outcomes, and where only truth-determinate sentences take a non-zero stake value. As, by (1)- (4) for truth-determinate sentences, the betting-quotient distribution for these sentences is classical, by the converse DutchBook theorem for classical probability for bivalent languages, Bn cannot be a Dutch book. Thus by reductio, P cannot be Dutch booked. □ Theorem 5. Any function P that satisfies both (1)- (4) Hence, by (1), P(DA)  P(DB). From this, by (5**), it follows that P(A)  P(B). On
